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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b) and (c), Appellant/Cross-Respondent Blaine County School 
District No. 61 (hereinafter, "School District" or "District") disagrees with the Hennefers' 
statement of the case, and would refer the Court to the District's Statement of the Case set out in 
the District's opening brief. The District also disagrees with the Hennefers' recitation of the facts 
as more particularly set out below: 
The Hennefers rely heavily on Dr. Gill, a human factors expert, to testify concerning 
what Mr. Lopez saw and would have believed as he approached the driver's training vehicle. 
They make a point that Dr. Gill was the only person to visit the crash site at twilight. 
Respondents' Brief, p. 6. However, they neglect to mention that Dr. Gill did not visit the crash 
site on the same day as the accident. See Tr. 1122, LI. 13-22. Thus, even though Dr. Gill may 
have been at the site a half-hour before sunrise, it was a different time of year and there is no 
evidence it was under the same weather conditions. Thus, the angle of the sunlight and the 
lighting in general would have been different. In addition, she admits she did not position the 
vehicles in the same location. Tr. 1123, LI. 7-9. Finally, although he was at the trial and 
available to testify, she testified about Mr. Lopez's state of mind. That is, Dr. Gill concluded that 
Mr. Lopez, seeing the marker lights on the side of the Buick, would have thought that the car 
was simply parked on the side of the road. However, this is her own speculation-a "logical 
conclusion on his part" as she phrased it-and not based on Mr. Lopez's testimony. Tr. 1129, 
LI. 2-12. 
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Plaintiffs also relied on Dr. Gill to speculate on Austin's state of mind-specifically, that 
he would mindlessly follow any instruction given by Mr. Mecham. See Respondents' Brief, p. 
7-9. Gill's testimony was speculative. There was no evidence she knew what Austin was 
thinking, nor any evidence that she had made an effort to familiarize herself with Austin's 
personality or background. Certainly the testimony showed that Austin was no shrinking violet. 
Mrs. Hennefer related that "Austin was the kind of kid that liked to try everything, and so he did, 
of course, everything, and so he did, of course, the football and basketball and track .... So he just 
was a really active kid and wasn't ever afraid to try something once." Tr. 725, LI. 5-13. He was 
not intimidated by or afraid of the animals with which he worked. Tr. 747, LI. 12-13; Tr. 748, 
LI. 3-7. Mr. Hennefer described Austin as having "an attitude about him that he could do 
anything." Tr. 296, LI. 9-11. He also admitted that Austin was an attentive driver. Tr. 345, LI. 3-
11. 
Plaintiffs contend that the School District misstated facts in its brief. This is a red herring 
by Plaintiffs. For instance Plaintiffs claim that it was inaccurate to state that there was little or no 
traffic at the time of the accident. However, that is not just Defendant's characterization. Officer 
Ornelas, who was driving the second vehicle to come across the accident scene, stated: "On that 
day I don't recall hardly any traffic. I don't remember seeing anybody ahead of me, and I don't 
remember seeing any headlights close behind me at all." Tr. 354, LI. 3-5. Jennifer Mares, a 
student in the driver's education car, described seeing only a few cars at the intersection of 
Highway 20 and 75. Tr. 478, LI. 20-24. Hugh Durham was the first to come across the accident 
scene. He testified that Mr. Lopez's vehicle was the only vehicle he had seen ahead of him on 
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Highway 20, and that "vehicle was a ways in front" of him. Tr. 828, L. 18 - Tr. 829, L. 5. It is, 
instead, Plaintiffs' characterization of there being heavy traffic or rush-hour traffic, as if this was 
Blue Lakes Boulevard in Twin Falls or State Street in Boise, that was misleading. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the School District is wrong about there not being other places 
to tum around. However, it is uncontroverted that the rest area had been blocked off due to 
construction, and that the gravel shed near the intersection, where Mr. Mecham had planned on 
turning around, was in use by road sanding vehicles. Plaintiffs only identified one location that 
could have been visible in the dark due to being brightly lit up, but that was apparently only 
identified a few months prior to the trial. See Tr. 339, LI. 16-21. There is no evidence that that 
one driveway was visible to Mr. Mecham at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Mecham had not really intended to tum around at the gravel 
shed, but simply had Austin tum around when his 30 minutes of drive time were up. However, 
this completely twists Mr. Mecham's testimony. Mr. Mecham actually told the jury: 
A. If I had two students in the car, I would drive -- I would try to 
drive at least 30 minutes. At times I went over 30 minutes because 
it depends on where it was safe to tum around. 
Q. When you had a student drive more than 30 minutes, would you 
write down the time accurately? 
A. Exactly, no. 
Tr. 943, LI. 8-14 (underline added). Mr. Mecham only wrote down the expected time of the 
drive. Tr. 944, L. 5. Thus, Plaintiffs' contention that Mr. Mecham simply had the students tum 
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around when their 30 minutes where up, no matter the conditions or circumstances, is pure 
fantasy. 
Plaintiffs deny that Austin had substantial driving experience, but that he only had driven 
a total of 3.3 hours. However, that is not what Plaintiffs' testimony was at the trial. Mrs. 
Hennefer related: 
Q. Did he use the motorcycle a lot? 
A. He did. He used it on -- you know, he irrigated with it. He 
would use it, and they had a path up the middle of the field, 
and he and the dog would race to the mainline and see who 
would get there first. The dog got to where he would cut 
across the field and Austin wasn't able to do that on the 
motorcycle, but Zip was with him a lot. 
Tr. 753, L. 24 - Tr. 754, L. 5. Mr. Hennefer similarly testified: 
Q. Could you describe for the jury the amount of driving 
experience that Austin had prior to his death? 
A. Austin -- I wouldn't say he had a lot, and he had no 
experience on the highway, but he had a motorcycle, and he 
used that to irrigate with. He drove that from the house up 
to the mainline, which wasn't even a quarter of a mile, but 
he would drive that back and forth. We had a 4-wheeler and 
he would drive that back and forth on the place. And then 
the little pickup that I had, he drove that. 
And there was one time that Austin and I went hunting, and 
it was out on the Carey-Kamima desert and there was 
nobody around, and I thought that would be a good 
opportunity to give him a chance to drive a little bit, and I 
allowed him to drive on that dirt road and only part of the 
way back in. And we never did see anybody, but Austin did 
good that time. 
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Tr. 302, L. 13 - Tr. 303, L. 4. Mr. Hennefer later admitted that Austin had driven a pickup 
almost every day for two years. Tr. 344, L. 17 - Tr. 345, L. 1. See also Tr. 345, L. 12 - Tr. 
346, L. 5 (Austin had also driven tractor on his family's farm and probably drove vehicles when 
working for neighbors). Thus, for Plaintiffs to infer that Austin was an inexperienced driver is to 
contradict their own statements at trial. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
HENNEFERS 
Plaintiffs moved for costs and fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(c), which states: 
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the 
truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party 
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply 
to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the 
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it 
finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground 
to believe that the party might prevail on the matter, or (4) there 
was other good reason for the failure to admit. 
Plaintiffs complain that the District refused to admit that Mecham was negligent or that Austin 
Hennefer was not negligent. Respondent's Brief, p. 36. 
Although the Hennefers' brief does not mention it, an award of fees under Rule 37(c) is 
discretionary. Schwan 's Sales Enterprises Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 835, 136 
P.3d 297, 306 (2006). In analyzing whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court 
looks to (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
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the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 114,254 P.3d 11, 15 (2011). 
The District Court found two reasons for denying the request for fees. See Tr. 1315-
1316. First, the District Court determined that Idaho Code§ 6-918A prohibited the award of fees 
under Rule 37(c). Section 6-918A prohibits an award of attorney's fees against a governmental 
entity in a tort action unless the party seeking fees can show "by clear and convincing evidence, 
that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the 
commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." That section also provides that 
the right to fees "in legal actions ... that come within the purview of this act shall be governed 
exclusively by the provisions of this act and not by any other statute or rule of court .... " I.C. § 6-
918A (underline added). 
In Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 773 P.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals 
found an exception to§ 6-918A for fees awarded pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11. Kent, 116 Idaho at 23-
24. However, this was based on court's view that Rule 11 "is not a broad compensatory law," but 
"a court management tool." Kent, 116 Idaho at 23. As a matter of statutory interpretation, § 6-
918A does not allow for any exceptions. Accordingly, this Court should not read into § 6-918A 
an exception for fees awarded under the Rules, including Rule 37(c). 
Additionally, even if Kent was decided correctly, the Court of Appeal's reasoning does 
not apply here. The Hennefers' requests for admission did not pertain to "discrete pleading 
abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the overall course of a lawsuit" that would 
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bring it into the "court management" exception. Kent, 116 Idaho at 23. Rather, the requests for 
admission pertained to the broad, core factual issues to be presented to the jury. The Hennefers' 
Rule 37(c) request for fees under these circumstances is a request for fees as the prevailing 
party-exactly the type of rule or statute intended to be superseded by§ 6-918. 
The second reason for the District Court denying the Hennefers' request for fees was that 
one of the exceptions to the Rule applied, namely, that the School District had reasonable ground 
to believe that it might prevail on the matter. See Tr. 1315-1316. The District Court found that 
the School District had not made its defense in bad faith, and stated: "I think it is possible that 
the School District could have rubbed some negligence off onto Sergio and even Austin. I think 
that was a reasonable belief as far as apportioning negligence." Tr. 1315, L. 24 - Tr. 1316, L. 2. 
The District Court concluded that School District was reasonable in believing that "Sergio might 
have gotten some negligence and Austin might have gotten some negligence, I think that belief 
was reasonable under the circumstances." Tr. 1316, LI. 10-13. Even the Hennefers 
acknowledged that the School District's defense was not frivolous. Tr. 1314, LI. 20-23. 
The cases cited by the Hennefers do not assist them. In Ruge v. Posey, 114 Idaho 890, 
761 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1988), the Court of Appeals did not uphold an award of fees under Rule 
37(c) as the Hennefers assert in their brief. Rather, the court remanded the case to the trial court 
to consider the factors in Rule 37(c). Ruge, 114 Idaho at 892. 
In Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006), the Court upheld an award 
of fees under Rule 37(c) for a blanket denial of negligence. However, in that case, the Court held 
that the defendant's belief that she could prevail on the claim of negligence was unreasonable 
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because: (1) the police report referred to the defendant's actions as a contributing circumstance 
to the resulting accident, and the defendant had been issued a citation; and (2), as a matter of law, 
icy conditions do not justify a violation of Idaho's safety statutes. Contreras, 142 Idaho at 578. 
Given those facts, the Court concluded that the defendant should have admitted at least some 
measure of negligence, although the Court recognized the defendant could "have qualified her 
answer in a manner that allowed her to be truthful without fully admitting or denying the 
request." Contreras, 142 Idaho at 578. Similarly, in Marchand v. 1lfercy 1lfedical Ctr., 22 F.3d 
933 (9th Cir. 1994), the court's decision to uphold a Rule 37(c) award of fees was based on a 
blanket denial of negligence where there were no basis in the facts for such denial. Conversely, 
in Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 86 P.3d 458 (2004), the Court concluded that defendant's 
belief she might prevail at trial was reasonable because she was not issued a traffic citation, the 
accident report did not assign her any responsibility, and her accident reconstruction expert 
would have testified that another party had a greater opportunity to avoid the collision. Bailey, 
139 Idaho at 755. 
Like the defendant in Bailey, Mr. Mecham was not issued a citation or charged with a 
crime. See Tr. 979, LI. 1-4. Unlike Contreras, where the plaintiffs request was limited to 
admitting negligence (i.e., a duty and breach thereof), see Contreras, 142 Idaho at 577 and n. 2, 
the Hennefers request for admission specifically asked the School District to "admit that Jeffrey 
A. Mecham negligently and proximately caused the accident which is the subject matter of this 
lawsuit." R. 283 (underline added). There was evidence to suggest that other parties, to-wit: Mr. 
Lopez and Austin (the drivers of the respective vehicles) were negligent and had proximately 
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caused the accident. 
However, as to Austin, the Hennefers wanted the District to admit that "Austin Hennefer 
was not negligent [i.e., did not have a duty and did not breach said duty] in relation to the cause 
of the motor vehicle accident." R. 283; R. 289. Clearly this is not the case here. Mr. Meecham 
was not the driver of the School District vehicle; Austin Hennefer was. Under the Idaho law and 
the standards of the driver's education class, Austin had a duty to maintain a proper lookout and 
operate the vehicle safely. Even the investigating officer concluded that Austin contributed to the 
accident. Tr. 454, LI. 18-20. Per the holding in Contreras, the primary case on which the 
Hennefers rely, it would have been unreasonable to make a blanket statement that Austin was not 
negligent. 
As the District Court recognized, there was a possibility that a jury would have assigned 
some of the negligence to the other parties. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the School 
District to not fully admit the requests for admission as to Mr. Mecham and Austin Hennefer. 
The Hennefers have not shown that District Court acted outside its discretion. Accordingly, the 
decision of the District Court to not award fees per Rule 37(c) should be upheld. 
B. THE PROPER RECKLESSNESS STANDARD. 
Plaintiffs want to jump into arguing about whether the jury's finding of recklessness was 
supported by substantial evidence. See Respondents' Brief, p. 14. That is, however, irrelevant if 
the judge and the jury employed the wrong standard. 
Significantly, the Hennefers do not contest that the jury instruction was incorrect. See 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22. Rather, the Hennefers' counter-argument is that LC. § 6-904C 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9 
does not govern the reckless disregard standard in LC. § 49-623. However, that is not the point 
of the School District's argument. The School District has demonstrated that under Idaho law, 
recklessness requires more than gross negligence; but the standard advanced by Plaintiffs, 
adopted by the District Court, and used in the jury instructions only requires the lesser finding of 
gross negligence. 
The Hennefers cite to Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 128 P.3d 897 (2005) (Athay I), for 
the proposition that "the statute [i.e., LC. § 6-904C] expressly provides that the definition applies 
only to Chapter 9 of Title 6, Idaho Code. By its terms, it does not apply to Chapter 6 of Title 49, 
Idaho Code."1 Athay I, 142 Idaho at 365. However, the Hennefers ignore the very next 
paragraph wherein the Court adopts the definition of "reckless disregard" from Hodge v. 
Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 417 P.2d 75 (1966), and explains: 
" 'Reckless disregard of the rights of others' could be regarded as 
the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually 
perceives the danger and continues his course of conduct." We 
distinguished reckless disregard from gross negligence in that the 
latter would apply where the driver does not know of the high 
degree of manifest danger, but should have known. 
Athay I, 142 Idaho at 365 (underline added). Plaintiffs also ignore the subsequent decision in 
Athay II that, "[t]o constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm, but ... the actor must actually perceive the high degree of 
probability that harm will result and continue in his course of conduct." Athay v. Stacey, 146 
1 Contrary to Plaintiffs' insinuation, the School District argued the application of the standards 
from Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 417 P.2d 75 (1966), and Athay before the District Court. 
See, e.g .• R. 135-137. 
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Idaho 407,414, 196 P.3d 325,332 (2008) (Athay II) (citations omitted; underline added). 
The jury instruction on "recklessness" and the standard used by the District Court 
includes gross negligence and is inconsistent with this Court's decisions on what constitutes 
reckless behavior in the Athay decisions, and its decisions under the former guest statutes and the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the District Court erred in applying the incorrect standard 
when making its decisions on summary judgment and as to the post-trial motions, and erred in its 
jury instructions. For these reasons, the Court should either hold that Mr. Mecham did not act 
recklessly as a matter of law, or remand the case to the District Court for a new trial. 
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF WILLFUL WRONGDOING. 
In a bit of hyperbole, Plaintiffs argue that there is substantial evidence that Mr. Mecham 
"intentionally instructed Austin Hennefer to perform the most hazardous turnabout maneuver, in 
the most hazardous visibility conditions, on the most hazardous road surface conditions, in the 
most hazardous speed location, and when he knew a car was hazardously close and in violation 
of LC. § 49-645(1)." Respondents' Brief, p. 15. All of these assertions are untrue or 
exaggerations: 
(i) The turnabout maneuver (a three point tum) is an accepted style of turnabout that 
is required to be taught to students. Thus, it is not de facto hazardous. Moreover, 
Mr. Miller indicated that the road was not wide enough to make au-tum. Tr. 420, 
LI. 12-15. Thus, in the worsening conditions and with the planned turnabout 
location unavailable, it was the only reasonable method to tum the car around. 
(ii) All of the witnesses and experts indicated that although dark, visibility was good. 
(iii) Mr. Mecham did not choose the road conditions. The evidence is quite clear that 
road conditions worsened during the drive. 
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(iv) There is no evidence that the speed limits were different between where the tum 
was executed and other possible locations to tum around. 
(v) The only evidence is that Mr. Mecham did not see Mr. Lopez's vehicle until at the 
time of the collision. He did not see Mr. Lopez's vehicle prior to initiating the 
tum. Ms. Mares did not see Mr. Lopez's vehicle prior to the collision. Plaintiffs 
argue that Austin was not negligent which necessarily implies that, if true, Austin 
did not see Mr. Lopez's vehicle before initiating the tum. 
Plaintiffs also place undue emphasis on Mr. Mecham's training, suggesting that the 
failure to strictly follow guidelines on class management were not only the proximate cause of 
the accident, but suggested willful conduct on the part of Mr. Mecham. Although the Plaintiffs 
fault Mr. Mecham for not having written objectives or properly maintaining driving logs, there is 
no evidence that if Mr. Mecham had written down his plan for Austin to drive approximately 30 
minutes and tum around near the junction of Highways 20 and 75, it would have made one iota 
of difference. Whether written down or verbal, the drive would still have occurred at the same 
time and place. Similarly, whether or not Mr. Mecham kept accurate logs of the student's driving 
time had nothing to do with whether this accident occurred. Accepting Plaintiffs' theory would 
be tantamount to also accepting that a driver should be considered to have acted willfully or 
recklessly if he or she was involved in an accident, and it was discovered that he or she had not 
signed the auto registration card. I.C. § 49-421(2). 
Plaintiffs attach unwarranted significance to the fact that Mr. Mecham was taught that a 
three-point tum is more dangerous than other types of approved turnabout. In Carrillo v. Boise 
Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 274 P.3d 1256 (2012), this Court indicated that "willful or reckless 
misconduct is a form of negligence that involves both intentional conduct and knowledge of a 
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substantial risk of harm." Carrillo, 152 Idaho at 751. The Court further noted that it differed 
"from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it 
contains a risk of harm to others, in that the action to be reckless must recognize that his conduct 
involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct 
negligent." Id. "To constitute reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm, but ... the actor must actually perceive the high degree of 
probability that harm will result and continue in his course of conduct." Athay II, 146 Idaho at 
414 ( citations omitted; underline added). As noted above, three-point turns were not verboten-
they were required to be taught to and practiced by the students. It involved a degree of risk if 
performed in the wrong location or wrong circumstances. But this incident was on a rural 
highway with little or no traffic at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs have failed to show that Mr. 
Mecham knew of the high probability of harm in this particular case-an approaching vehicle-
but nevertheless proceeded to instruct Austin to initiate the tum. 
Plaintiffs also continue to torture Mr. Mecham's testimony and the evidence. For 
instance, Plaintiffs argue "[h]e 'assumed' it would be fine to practice three-point turns in high-
speed traffic." Respondents' Brief, p. 18. However, as far as Mr. Mecham and the other 
passengers knew, there was no traffic in the vicinity, high-speed or otherwise. Also, Mr. 
Mecham's actual testimony showed that he understood if there was sufficient distance, a three-
point turn was fine on highways. Tr. 941, LI. 4-5. He also added practicing a three-point tum 
"was not my intention when I went on that drive." Tr. 941, LI. 9-10. That is, because the gravel 
shed was in use, the planned tum around area could not be used. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13 
Plaintiffs continue to assert "Mr. Mecham admitted the last memory he had before 
waking up in the hospital was looking over his left shoulder and seeing headlights coming." 
Respondents' Brief, p. 18. In their closing arguments, Plaintiffs misrepresented this testimony 
as an admission that he had seen Mr. Lopez's vehicle prior to Austin initiating the tum. 
However, what Mr. Mecham actually stated was he remembered getting into the car at the school 
in Carey, and he remembered "looking over through the driver's passenger-or side window and 
seeing the two lights, and that's it." Tr. 920, L. 5 -Tr. 921, L. 3. 
Plaintiffs also contend that "[b ]ased on the testimony of the experts, the headlights of the 
Lopez Honda would have been visible to Mecham before Mecham instructed Austin Hennefer to 
do the three-point tum." Respondents' Brief, p. 19. This evidence indicates, at most, that Mr. 
Mecham did "not know of the high degree of manifest danger, but should have known"-i.e., at 
most gross negligence, but not recklessness. Athay I, 142 Idaho at 365. Since the jury had been 
instructed as to gross negligence, it is not possible to determine from the record whether the 
jury's decision was due to the incorrect instruction, or because the jury disbelieved Mr. Mecham. 
Certainly, there is no evidence that Mr. Mecham was actually aware of Mr. Lopez's vehicle 
before the crash. Accordingly, the Court should either find that there was no recklessness as a 
matter of law, or remand the matter with instructions to conduct a new trial. 
D. THE JURY AND TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND MR. MECHAM'S 
CONDUCT TO BE WILLFUL AND RECKLESS. 
Considering that the District Court and the jury both applied a gross-negligence standard 
to Mr. Mecham's conduct, it is impossible for this Court to conclude that the District Court or 
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jury correctly found Mr. Mecham's conduct willful and reckless. The only evidence before this 
Court is that Mr. Mecham did not see Mr. Lopez's car before instructing Austin to make the tum. 
Based on that evidence, the most the jury or Court could conclude was that Mr. Mecham had 
been grossly negligent. Accordingly, the Court should either find that there was no recklessness 
as a matter of law, or remand this matter for a new trial. 
E. THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM SHOULD HA VE BEEN CHANGED. 
Plaintiffs indicate that "there is [sic] no objection to the way the question [concerning 
recklessness] was worded." Respondents' Brief, p. 24. This is incorrect. The District objected to 
the ordering of the Special Verdict Form that placed the question on willful or reckless conduct 
before the determination of the damage award. See Tr. 1227. See also Supp. R. 229 (special 
verdict) and R. 390. 
In any event, by placing the question on recklessness before the question as to the amount 
of damages, it required the jury to consider and to have in mind whether they believed Mr. 
Mecham acted recklessly when determining the damages. This suggests that the jury's 
determination of damages would have taken on a punitive nature depending on whether they 
found Mr. Mecham to have acted recklessly. Since punitive damages are prohibited in this case, 
the jury should not have considered the question of recklessness before determining damages. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HA VE INCLUDED A LOOKOUT 
INSTRUCTION. 
Plaintiffs argue that it was proper for the District Court to exclude an instruction that 
drivers are required to keep a proper lookout. That the respective drivers (Lopez and Austin) 
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were not keeping proper lookouts was key to the School District's defense and reasonable under 
the facts, and an instruction of the drivers' duties should have been given to the jury. Vanderford 
Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261, 269 (2007). That the witnesses may have 
agreed maintaining a proper lookout is a rule of the road does not equate to an instruction on the 
law given by the Court. 
Instruction No. 19 did not adequately cover the subject. Instruction No. 19 only had to do 
with speed, and stated in the relevant part that "[n]o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing." Supp. R. 217. It says nothing about keeping a lookout, and 
could not be interpreted by any reasonable person as applying to Austin, whose vehicle was 
stationary at the time of the collision. 
It also was not adequately covered by Instruction 12 on negligence, because negligence 
depends on finding a duty, but by not including the required instruction, the jury was not 
instructed as to Austin's duty. This is particularly significant as much of Dr. Gill's testimony was 
intended to suggest to the jury that Austin had no duty-that he mindlessly did no more or less 
than what Mr. Mecham told him. Moreover, Instruction 12 specifically states that it only pertains 
to Austin, and, therefore, excludes Mr. Lopez. 
Plaintiffs also suggest that the instruction would have been prejudicial to them because it 
excluded Mr. Mecham since he was not a driver. However, the rule only pertains to operators of 
a vehicle, so excluding someone that was not operating a vehicle could hardly be prejudicial. See 
Vaughn v. Porter, 140 Idaho 470,473, 95 P.3d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 2004) (describing duty and case 
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law). Moreover, Instruction 16 specifically set out Mr. Mecharn's duty as a driving instructor. 
Supp. R. 214. 
The Hennefers also contend that the instruction was not supported by the facts. For this 
proposition to be true, Austin must have kept a proper lookout, in which case he would have seen 
Mr. Lopez's vehicle (which Plaintiffs' argue was plainly visible) prior to making the tum. 
Accordingly, accepting this argument requires a determination that Austin was negligent and, 
possibly, reckless. 
In short, the instruction on keeping a lookout should have been given, and the failure to 
do so prejudiced the School District and misled the jury into believing that Austin had no duty to 
keep a lookout. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT EVALUATE THE DAMAGE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiffs correctly point out that the District Court stated the standard for a new trial 
based on an excessive verdict. But stating the standard and applying it are two different matters. 
The District Court refused to apply the standard, stating: 
Here the jury weighed what it considered a human life was worth. I 
think they did no more and no less than what they were asked to 
do. If I overrode the jury's decision, the plaintiff might as well 
have had a Court trial. 
Tr. 1297, L. 24 - Tr. 1298, L. 4. See also Tr. 1299, L. 2 - Tr. 1300, LI. 5 (further indicating 
that it was improper for the court to evaluate the jury award). Since the District Court refused to 
perform the analysis required by Rule 59(a)(5), the court erred in denying the motion for new 
trial. 
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H. THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
The simple fact of the matter is that the jury allocated the entire fault for the accident to 
Mr. Mecham, even though it was uncontradicted that Lopez's speed had contributed to the 
accident, and that Austin had a clear legal duty as a driver to maintain a lookout and safely 
operate his vehicle. 
Plaintiffs made a point to argue that because Mr. Mecham (the very first time in teaching 
a class) did not maintain written records or make driving plans to the same extent as an 
experienced driver's education teacher did or should have, he was irresponsible in supervising 
the students while driving. Plaintiffs suggested that the School District did not care about human 
life because the School District investigated the accident and determined to defend itself. The 
purpose of such arguments is not to establish liability-they are irrelevant to liability-but to 
encourage the jury to punish the School District. 
I. THE VERDICT REPRESENTS A DE FACTO AW ARD OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES. 
Plaintiffs are correct that no instructions were given as to awarding punitive damages, but 
the result was the same. The Plaintiffs point out that the jury and the Court were conflicted over 
determining the value of a human life. But that was not the issue before the jury. That is, the jury 
was not tasked with deciding what Austin's life was worth, but rather the Plaintiffs' damages 
from the loss of that life. The legislature has set a cap on such damages representing the 
maximum amount that the legislature believes represents a reasonable amount for non-economic 
damages. Any amount above the cap is punitive. 
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This is clear by comparing the standard for punitive damages and the standard for 
allowing damages in excess of the cap. Punitive damages may be awarded when a claimant 
proves "oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct" by the defendant. I.C. § 6-
1604(1). This Court has explained that "[t]he action required to support an award of punitive 
damages is that the defendant acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of 
or disregard for its likely consequences." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 
145 Idaho 241, 250, 178 P.3d 606, 615 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The mental 
state required to support an award of punitive damages is an extremely harmful state of mind, 
whether that be termed malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence, malice, oppress10n, 
wantonness; or simply deliberate or willful." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Similarly, as noted above, the cap on damages in§ 6-1603 does not apply if the "[c]auses 
of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct." As noted above, willful or reckless 
misconduct requires that the wrongful act be willful or performed with knowledge of a high 
probability of danger and a disregard of the same. In other words, the same conduct that supports 
piercing the tort cap supports an award of punitive damages. Because of the nature of the 
conduct, and the additional damages authorized, permitting the piercing of the tort cap is a de 
facto allowance of punitive damages. Even the judge acknowledged that "the verdict reflects to 
some degree the jury's distaste for the degree of negligence involved in Austin's death." Tr. 
1299, LI. 2-4. Plaintiffs' closing argument lambasted the District for investigating the accident 
and hiring legal counsel rather than offering an apology. Supp. Tr. (Israel) 28-29. Plaintiffs 
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argued that Mecham was unsupportive, did not perform his job, and did not take it seriously. 
Supp. Tr. (Israel) 32 and 36. Counsel stated that Mrs. Hennefer, who works for the school 
district, "has to go to work every day knowing that they're against her. They're against her son." 
Supp. Tr. (Israel) 46, LI. 9-11. He also argued that "if we let Mecham off the hook, that's 
basically telling your community that we don't value good educators, that anything will go." 
Supp. Tr. (Israel) 91, LI. 7-10. Thus, Plaintiffs' argument to the jury was not limited to 
requesting the valuation of the loss of support and comfort that Austin provided to them, but a 
request that the jury penalize the School District. 
Since punitive damages are not allowed against governmental entities in claims made 
under the ITCA, see LC. § 6-918 damages in excess of the tort cap should also be prohibited. 
J. A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HA VE BEEN GRANTED. 
Rule 59 provides for a new trial when there was in insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict, or that it is against the law, or there was an error in law occurring at trial. I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(6) and (7). The applicable standard is that "'Reckless disregard of the rights of others' 
could be regarded as the type of conduct engaged in by the driver when he actually perceives the 
danger and continues his course of conduct." Athay I, 142 Idaho at 365. Thus, "[t]o constitute 
reckless disregard, the actor's conduct must not only create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, 
but ... the actor must actually perceive the high degree of probability that harm will result and 
continue in his course of conduct." Athay II, 146 Idaho at 414. As this Court explained in 
Carrillo, recklessness requires more than doing an act intentionally with knowledge it contains a 
risk of harm to others. Id., 152 Idaho at 751. 
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Both the Court and Plaintiffs focus on attenuated facts, not whether Mr. Mecham 
perceived the imminent danger of an approaching vehicle. In denying the motion for new trial, 
the Court explained: 
So, in my view, there doesn't have to be any evidence of 
knowledge of whether there's a car corning. The essence of the 
recklessness to me was that he was instructed during the driver's 
training instruction for the teachers when and where and how you 
do a three-point turn, and that was violated in this case. 
Tr. 1287, LI. 13-18. All the District Court is describing is doing an act intentionally with 
knowledge it contains a risk of harm to others, not the heightened knowledge of risk necessary 
for recklessness. As this Court observed in State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 362-63, 362 P.2d 1083, 
1086 (1961): 
Conduct cannot be in reckless disregard of the safety of others 
unless the act or breach of duty is itself intended, notwithstanding 
that the actor knows of facts which would lead any reasonable man 
to realize the extreme risk to which it subjects the safety of others. 
It is reckless for a driver of an automobile intentionally to cross a 
through highway in defiance of a stop sign if a stream of vehicles 
is seen to be closely approaching in both directions, but if his 
failure to stop is due to the fact that he has permitted his attention 
to be diverted so that he does not know that he is approaching the 
crossing, he may be merely negligent and not reckless. 
Papse, 83 Idaho at 362-63 (quoting Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 500). In Papse, the 
defendant was found to have been reckless in running a stop sign because he was aware of a high 
volume of traffic on the cross-road, that there was no stop sign for the cross-road, and that 
because of obstructions, he could not see any traffic until he had come to a stop and checked for 
traffic. Papse, 83 Idaho at 363. Conversely, in Wilson v. Bacon, 78 Idaho 389, 304 P.2d 908 
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(1956), this Court found that there was only negligence, not recklessness, where the defendant 
had run a stop sign even though another vehicle was clearly visible approaching the intersection, 
and that the defendant "wholly failed to maintain any lookout whatsoever at said intersection, ... 
without looking to the right or left .... " Wilson, 78 Idaho at 390-91. 
Thus, not only did the District Court apply an incorrect standard, but the facts 
demonstrate that the conduct does not rise to the level of recklessness. 
K. DR. GILL'S TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN PERMITTED. 
The School District had objected to Dr. Gill's proposed testimony several times, 
including before trial through a motion in limine, and again prior to her offering her testimony at 
trial and several times during her testimony. See Tr. 1103 -Tr. 1112; Tr. 1123 -Tr. 1125; Tr. 
1129-30; Tr. 1131; Tr. 1134; Tr. 1135 - Tr. 1146; Tr. 1148. Thus, for Plaintiffs to suggest 
that the School District failed to object is not supported by the record. 
Plaintiffs' claim that Dr. Gill's testimony was to rebut "testimony of the School District's 
expert witness Mr. Maddux who testified Mr. Lopez had plenty of time to see the School District 
car and stop." Respondents' Brief, p. 33. However, that is not what Dr. Gill testified about. 
When asked about that issue, Dr. Gill could not respond. Specifically: 
Q. Regardless of what may or may not happen in practice, the 
obligation of a driver is to drive at a speed so that they are able to 
perceive and react to a hazard that may be in the roadway within 
the distance they're able to see; correct? Are you going to disagree 
with that when Mr. Laumann, Mr. Maddux, and Mr. Beaufort all 
agreed with it, the three accident reconstructionists in this case. 
A. I'm not going to say I'm going to disagree with it. What I'm 
struggling with is if this is outside my area of expertise. 
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Tr. 1161, LI. 3-13. Rather, her testimony was simply to explain what Mr. Lopez believed he 
saw. In her direct testimony, Dr. Gill testified: 
Mr. Lopez, when he's driving down the road, he sees a red light 
what he believes is off to the side of the road. He makes an 
interpretation of that visual cue. 
Perception is driven by expectation. By that I mean you see 
something, you're not sure what it is, based on your previous 
experience in a similar situation, you're going to make an 
assumption about what you're seeing based on what you would 
expect to see. 
So, in other words, he sees a red light off to what he believes is the 
side of the road. He's not going to make the assumption that there 
is a car horizontal across both lanes of traffic -- of travel because 
that's not something that we normally see in our driving 
experience. Rather, we do see often vehicles off to the side of the 
road pointing towards the road because any time someone is 
pulling out into the roadway in front of us, coming from a 
crossroad or a driveway, that's exactly the position they're in. So 
his perception, driven by his expectation, is that red light that he 
sees is a vehicle that's about to pull out in the road in front of him. 
Tr. 1131, L. 17 - Tr. 1132, L. 11. Thus, her testimony was not rebuttal to whether or not Mr. 
Lopez could have seen the other vehicle, but to tell the jury what Mr. Lopez thought he saw. This 
is not only speculative on her part-trying to divine Mr. Lopez's thoughts-but improper 
because Mr. Lopez had been at the trial and available to testify to what he perceived or thought 
he perceived. Plaintiffs contend that they did not call Mr. Lopez as a witness because of a 
language barrier, yet the trial transcript records that there were interpreters present. See Tr. 47. 
As to Austin, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Gill's testimony was rebuttal to the School 
District's affirmative defense of comparative negligence. Again, though, Dr. Gill's testimony 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 23 
was simply about Austin's state of mind, what he was thinking. See, e.g. Tr. 1148, LI. 2-6. 
Essentially, Dr. Gill was offering the Nuremberg defense2 that Austin was merely carrying out 
his instructions. See Tr. 1139 - Tr. 1140. That defense was rejected at the Nuremberg trials and 
should be rejected here because it is a defense based on absolving the actor of having any duty 
other than to follow instructions. "The existence of a duty of care is a question of law .... " Jones 
v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011). Thus, not only was Dr. Gill's 
testimony improper rebuttal but it also invaded the province of the Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, and those set out in the School District's opening brief, the 
District Court erred in allowing Dr. Gill to testify. 
L. COSTS. 
Cross-Appellants assert that they be awarded costs of appeal as a matter of right should 
they be found to be the prevailing party on the Cross-Appeal. I.A.R. 40. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should hold that the District Court 
appropriately denied an award of attorney's fees to the Hennefers; but the Court should find that 
the School District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the issue of recklessness, 
and/or order a new trial. 
2 See United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 12 n. 13 (1 st Cir. 2012) ("[W]e reject the 
validity of a so-called Nuremberg defense ... 'the fact that any person acted pursuant to the order 
of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime.' ") ( quoting 
Judgment of the Tribunal, Trial of Wilhelm von Leeb and Thirteen Others, 12 Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals 1, 71-72 (United States War Crimes Commission 1949)). 
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DATED this 1gth day of August, 2014. 
N, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
By,....,-r,,,....a,==-----''----+-..:+-,i:--------=:~-
Brian K. Julian, 0 
Attorneys for App 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Jeffrey J. Hepworth 
JEFFREY J. HEPWORTH, P.A. & 
ASSOCIATES 
161 5th Avenue South, Suite 100 
P.O. Box 1806 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1806 
Fax No. (208) 736-0041 
Attorneys for Plaintifft 
Kent L. Hawkins 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax No. (208) 232-2499 
Attorneys for Sergio Lopez-Rodriguez 
Donald J. Farley 
POWERS TOLMAN FARLEY, PLLC 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707 
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